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The Japanese “main bank” relationship, under which a bank holds equity in a
firm and plays a leading role in its decision-making and financing, may leave a firm
dependent on its main bank for financing due its information advantage over other
potential lenders.  While alternative sources of finance may mitigate this dependency, it
may resurface during episodes of financial turbulence.
We examine the sensitivity of returns on portfolios of Japanese firm equity to
the returns of their main banks using a three-factor arbitrage-pricing model.  We find no
significant dependence on main bank returns when coefficient values are constrained to
remain constant over the entire sample.  However, the data strongly suggest a structural
break subsequent to the last quarter of 1997, a turbulent period for Japanese financial
markets.  When a structural break is introduced, main bank sensitivity increases after
the break, usually to significantly positive levels.
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1. Introduction
There is a large literature discussing the nature of the Japanese “main bank”
system, under which most Japanese firms maintain a close relationship with a single
commercial bank.  The characteristics of this relationship are that a firm’s main bank is
usually a principal shareholder of the firm, and its primary lender.  In addition, the firm’s
main bank usually plays an important role in monitoring the firm and assisting it during
periods of crisis.
2
Because of these close ties, the main bank is likely to have superior information
about the firm than other potential lenders [Sheard (1994)].  For example, the main bank
can obtain information concerning a firm’s financial position by observing the flows of
funds into and out of the firm’s settlement account in its main bank [Aoki, et al (1994)].
The net impact on the firm of this information asymmetry is uncertain.  On one
hand, there is some evidence that this information advantage can ease a firm’s liquidity
constraints [e.g. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991)].  On the other hand, Weinstein
and Yafeh (1998) find that entities with strong main bank relationships pay higher net
interest rates.
3  Nevertheless, this evidence is insufficient to conclude that entities are
worse off under main bank relationships.  If a main bank relationship enhances firm
liquidity during periods of firm distress or low aggregate liquidity levels, the relationship
may be interpreted as the main bank insuring its client firms.  In this context, the higher
overall average rates can be interpreted as insurance premia.
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However, dependency on an individual bank may have adverse consequences if
that bank becomes reluctant or unable to extend credit.  Because of its information
advantages, main banks are believed to carry the primary monitoring duties towards their
entities, while other potential lenders typically follow the main bank’s lead in assessing
the creditworthiness of a potential borrower [Aoki (1994)].  Consequently, firms known
to have a close relationship with a single main bank will have difficulty raising funds
from other sources.  Other potential lenders will hold some positive probability that the
firm is unable to obtain funds from its main bank because the main bank possesses
adverse information about the firm.
There is some evidence that such a channel operated in Japan. Gibson (1995)
found that investment decisions of firms with financially distressed main banks were
more sensitive to firm liquidity conditions.  Kang and Stulz (2000) demonstrate that firms
which were more dependent on bank financing experienced lower returns in the first
three years of the 1990’s, a period of credit contraction for Japan.  Yamori and Murakami
(1999) demonstrate that the failure of the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank led to larger
abnormal stock returns for firms with closer relationships to the bank.
However, there has been speculation that financial liberalization has diminished
the dependence of firms on their main banks.  Since the mid-1970’s firms have enjoyed
greater flexibility in their financing decisions, particularly due to their heightened ability
to issue bonds directly [Aoki (1994)].  As such, they are less reliant on main bank
borrowing.  Weinstein and Yafeh (1998) find that differences identified in capitalization
between main bank client firms and non-client firms disappears in the 1980s.3
In this paper, we examine whether firms are still dependent on their main banks.
We examine the sensitivity of equity values of an equally-weighted portfolio of main
bank client firms to changes in the equity values of their main bank.  We look at a three-
factor model of bank asset returns in which, in addition to interest rates and the return on
the market portfolio, the client firms are sensitive to the returns on their main bank.
Our hypothesis is that the importance of a main bank relationship is likely to
change over time.  Holding firm financial health constant, a firm may be less dependent
on its main bank for funding when credit is plentiful.  When banks are reluctant to lend in
general, however, a firm that is unable to obtain funds from its main bank may find even
worse prospects from other potential lenders.  As such, firms with main bank
relationships may be even more sensitive to the condition of their main bank during
periods of financial turmoil.  Moreover, investigations that constrain the coefficients to be
constant over time may lead to false inferences.
The main bank relationship is also likely to be affected by changes in average
levels of financial fragility among firms.  Main banks usually organize financial rescue
packages when firms face financial difficulties.  Moreover, main banks usually bear more
than a proportional share of the losses in these rescue packages.  As a result, if a firm’s
main bank is weak, the probability of its rescue in the event of financial turmoil is
reduced.  For example, in the recent Sogo failure, IBJ offered to bear large losses to
encourage other banks to agree on the rescue plan.  In contrast, the weakness of Fuji
Bank may have played a role in the failure of Yamaichi Securities.
The financial strength of the main bank is also likely to be relevant.  Firms may
be sensitive to their main bank’s returns because changes in the underlying position of4
their main bank may affect its lending practices.  This effect should be stronger the
weaker is the main bank, as financially stronger banks are better placed to weather bad
news without aggressively changing their lending strategy.
We first examine the three-factor model constraining coefficients to be constant
for the duration of the sample period.  Our results suggest that the returns to firms over
the 1990s are negatively correlated with the returns on their main banks.  These results
suggest that the relationship between firms and their main banks are “zero-sum,” i.e. that
good news for firms’ creditors represented bad news for their client banks.
However, we then explicitly introduce the possibility of a structural break in our
specification, associated with the banking crisis that hit Japan with the rash of bank
failures in the middle of our sample.  Our hypothesis is that the insurance role of the main
bank relationship would be observable during episodes of financial turbulence when
credit was scarce.  We first consider three historical events as potential break dates, and
then use Andrews’ (1993) method for testing for structural change when the break date is
unknown.
The first historical break date we consider is the failure of Cosmo Credit
Corporation on July 31, 1995.  Commercial banks bore a large share of the burden of the
Cosmo Credit Cooperative’s failure, as well as those of Kizu Credit Corporation and
Hyogo Bank in August.  Peek and Rosengren (1998) note that the “Japan Premium,”
under which Japanese banks faced additional costs of funds relative to European and
United States banks, began shortly after these failures were revealed.
4
The second historical break date we consider is the failure of the Hanwa Bank on
November 21, 1996.  The failure of Hanwa Bank, a second regional bank, represented a5
regulatory watershed because the Ministry of Finance did not attempt to find a rescuing
bank, as had been the prevailing practice under the Japanese convoy system.
5  The
Deposit Insurance Corporation instead assumed Hanwa’s liabilities and closed the bank.
The third historical break date considered is the failure of Yamaichi Securities on
November 25, 1997.  Yamaichi’s failure was significant not only because it was the first
failure by one of the “big four” securities companies, but also because it disclosed that
Yamaichi was hiding 200 billion yen in losses.  This increased suspicion about the
quality of assets in Japan’s financial system.  The failure of Hokkaido Takushoku,
Japan’s first “city bank” failure, also took place in November of 1997.
While all of these dates seem like plausible candidates for a structural break in the
main bank relationship, the truth is that we are quite uncertain about the date of the
structural change.  Andrews (1993) provides a method of dealing with the problem of
unknown change point when one is willing to limit the potential change points to a subset
of the sample.  We proceed by searching for a structural break for the period starting in
mid-July of 1995 and ending at the end of 1997.  The methodology used, which is
described in more detail below, entails conducting an F-test for every possible break date
in the sub-sample and then choosing the date with the maximum F value as the candidate
date for a structural break.  The confidence intervals for the F-test are then explicitly
designed to account for manner in which the candidate break date was chosen.
Our results suggest evidence of a structural break in the sensitivity of portfolio
equity values for all of the main bank portfolios we study using both historical break
dates and the Andrews method.  The coefficient on main bank equity after the structural
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break, the period in the sample that we would consider more volatile, is consistently
higher than that before the structural break, again regardless of the method used to time
the structural break.  In addition, all of the entity portfolios except the Sanwa Bank and
Sumitomo Bank portfolios are shown to be positively dependent on main bank equity
values at statistically significant levels after the break.  The relative lack of significance
of the Sumitomo and Sanwa banks is not surprising, given that these are the main banks
in the sample with the greatest financial strength.  Finally, using the Andrews method, all
of the main bank portfolios in our sample suggest the fourth quarter of 1997 as the date of
the structural break.
These results are shown to be robust to a number of sensitivity tests.  First,
because main banks are exposed to their client firms to some degree, both as equity
holders and in their role as principal firm creditors, the issue of simultaneity arises in our
specifications.  To address this issue, we instrument for main bank returns using the
returns of other banks in the system as our instruments.  The intuition behind this
specification is that main bank returns will be dependent on the returns of other banks
because of news relevant to Japanese banks.  As these other banks are not, by definition,
as exposed to the main bank’s client firms as their main bank, their returns are valid as
instruments.
Our instrumental variable results are quite similar to those obtained using
ordinary least squares estimation.  As before, we find evidence of a structural break in the
sensitivity of portfolio equity values for all of the main bank portfolios.  In addition, the
coefficient on main bank equity after the structural break is again consistently higher than
that before the structural break.7
However, there are a few differences.  We now find that the dependence of the
Dai-ichi Kangyo portfolio on its main bank’s returns is also insignificant after the break.
After Sumitomo and Sanwa Bank, Dai-Ichi Kangyo is in the next strongest category, so
its relative lack of robustness is in keeping with the notion that sensitivity to main bank
returns should be greatest for the weakest banks in the sample.  The remaining majority
of main bank portfolios are positive and significant as before.
Second, the instrumental variables results are not as uniform in their timing of the
structural break.  While three of the main bank portfolios again find the structural break
in the fourth quarter of 1997, other banks’ results suggest the beginning of 1997, or some
time in 1996, as the date of the structural break.
We also examine the robustness of our results to the introduction of a Japanese
banking index to our specification.  It is possible that the estimated sensitivity of the
firms to their main bank returns may simply reflect sensitivity to news about Japan’s
banking system, rather than news specific to its main bank.  To test for this possibility,
we examine the robustness of our results to the inclusion of this additional factor using
both ordinary least squares and instrumental variables estimation methods.
The results for this alternative specification also support our basic hypotheses.
All of the specifications, regardless of the method used to identify the break date, show
evidence of a structural break in the data.  Moreover, a majority of main banks studied
still demonstrate a positive dependence on the returns of their main bank after the break
as well as an increase in their main bank coefficient.  Again, the financially weaker banks
in the sample display the greatest robustness.8
The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections.  Section 2 describes the
data set and introduces the methodology used in the paper.  Section 3 describes the basic
estimation results.  Section 4 discusses the robustness of our results to instrumental
variables estimation and to the inclusion of a bank index factor.  Section 5 concludes.
2. Methodology
2.1 Data
We identify main bank relationships by choosing firms whose largest shareholder
is one of a group of Japanese “city banks,” or the Industrial Bank of Japan.  City banks
and Long-Term Credit Banks have long been the primary financial intermediaries
associated with main bank activity in Japan.
Although there were 13 city banks and 3 long-term credit banks in 1988, we
dropped banks that experienced large mergers or experienced bankruptcy during our
sample period. Banks excluded due to merger include Mitsui Bank and Taiyo Kobe
Bank, which were merged into Sakura Bank in 1990, Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank,
which were merged into Asahi Bank in 1991, and Mitsubishi Bank and Bank of Tokyo,
which were merged into Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi in 1996.  Banks excluded due to
failure include Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, which failed in November 1997, Long-Term
Credit Bank of Japan which was nationalized in October 1998, and Nippon Credit, which
was nationalized in December 1998.
The main banks used in our study are then Sumitomo, Sanwa, Dai-ichi Kangyo,
Fuji, Tokai, Daiwa, and the Industrial Bank of Japan (IBJ).  Using data from Japanese9
Companies Quarterly, Summer 1999, we chose firms whose largest shareholder was one
of the above main banks.
Other methods for identifying main banks have been used in the literature. For
example, Gibson (1995) used questionnaire data from Toyo-Keizai Shinposya to identify
the identity of a firm's main bank.  Firms were asked to list the banks that they use.  Main
banks are identified as banks which are listed first, as the convention is
that firms list first the bank with which they maintain the closest relationship.
A difficulty with this methodology is that it exaggerates the prevalence of main-
bank relationships, because all firms have main bank relationships by definition.  In
contrast, our identification methodology may under-identify the number of main bank
relationships, because banks are restricted to hold no more than 5% equity shares in firms
due to the anti-trust regulation.  Nevertheless, for firms categorized by both methods,
Gibson (1995) found that the identification of firm main banks was not sensitive to the
methodology chosen.  Firms were identified as having the same main banks under both
methods 95% of the time.
6
Our final sample consists of 82 entities that are affiliated with seven main banks.
The summary statistics for the sample are shown in Table 1.  While main banks are
identified on the basis of end-of-sample equity shares, it can be seen that the share of
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financing the firms receive from their main banks are relatively stable over the sample,
indicating stability in the main bank relationship.
Bank financial strength is also identified using Moody’s rating for long-term
deposits in 1998.  It can be seen that the strongest main banks in the sample are Sanwa
and Sumitomo Banks, earning an A1 and A2 rating respectively.  Dai-Ichi Kangyo and
IBJ are the next strongest banks, earning an A3 rating.  The remaining banks in the
sample, Fuji, Tokai and Daiwa receive weaker ratings.
Our sample consists of daily data from 1/4/88 to 12/30/98, or 2741 observations
per firm.
7  We dropped firms that were thinly traded, defined as having four consecutive
trading days of no trading.  Individual days with no recorded trade are recorded as having
no price movements on that day.
2.2 Empirical specification
We consider the following three-factor arbitrage-pricing model
(1)  t t mb mb t m m t i j t R R i c R ε β β β + + + + = , ,
~
where  t R
~
 represents the return on the equity of a portfolio of entities, defined as the log
difference in equity values,  j c is a constant term,  t i  represents the interest rate, measured
by the overnight call rate, t m R , represents the return on the market portfolio,  t mb R ,
represents the return on the entity’s main bank, and  t ε represents an i.i.d. disturbance
term.
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Under the null hypothesis of no structural change,  , c , i β , m β  and mb β  will be
equal across the subgroups identified below.  Alternatively, given a structural break at
some interior date  ,
* t  we allow  c c =  if  ,
* t t ≤  where 
* t ,  c c ′ =  otherwise;  k k β β =  if
,
* t t ≤   k k β β ′ =  otherwise () mb m i k , , = .
We therefore proceed by first estimating equation (1) over the entire sample by
ordinary least squares.  We then split the sample according to the structural break date 
* t
and estimate the two sub-samples separately.
3. Results
3.1 No structural Break
Estimation results with no structural break for portfolios of entities sharing the
same main bank are reported in Table 2.  The results appear to confirm the contention
that a firm’s interests are not necessarily in line with those of its main bank.  The
estimated coefficient on main bank returns is negative and significant at the five-percent
level for all of the main bank groups studied except Daiwa and Fuji Bank, which are
insignificant.
In contrast, the coefficient estimate on the market beta is positive and significant
at the five-percent level.  Interestingly, the coefficient estimate of the market beta is
above one for all main bank portfolios in the study.  This suggests that main bank
relationships are most prevalent among high market beta firms.  The interest rate variable
is insignificant for all of the main bank portfolios in the study except IBJ, which is
positive and significant at a five percent confidence level.12
Finding a negative coefficient on the returns to the main bank is not necessarily
inconsistent with the notion that the main bank provides liquidity services to its entities.
The market is also pricing news concerning the division of the rents associated with main
bank activity between the main bank and its client firm.  Holding these rents constant,
good news for the main bank may represent bad news for its client firms.  This can
explain the overall negative coefficient found for most of the main bank portfolios for the
entire sample.
However, in times of financial distress, we would expect the coefficient on the
main bank return to become more positive.  During turbulent periods, the firms who
enjoy main bank affiliation will be more dependent on their main bank for financing.
Positive news for the main bank may then reflect positively on both the main bank’s
ability and willingness to extend funds to its client firms.  We next turn to the
investigation of such a relationship among Japanese banks in the turbulent latter portion
of the 1990s.
3.2 Historical Break Dates
To investigate the change in sensitivity of firm equity values to main bank returns
during turbulent periods, we divide the sample in two.  We first use historical events as
dates in which to divide the sample.  The three historical break dates considered are the
Cosmo Credit Corporation failure, which occurred on July 31, 1995, the Hanwa bank
failure, which occurred on November 21, 1996, and the Yamaichi Securities failure,
which occurred on November 25, 1997.13
The results are shown in Table 3.   mb β  represents the estimated coefficient on
main bank returns prior to the structural break, while  mb β ′  represents the estimated
coefficient on main bank returns after the structural break.
The F-test results show strong evidence of a structural break in the factors
determining main bank equity values for all main bank portfolios and all historical break
dates. The F-tests reported use the standard confidence intervals, which maintains the
assumption that the posited break dates are not subject to pre-testing bias.  We deal with
issues associated with pre-testing explicitly below.
In addition, all of the main banks studied also show a significant increase in the
main bank coefficient after the structural break for the first two break dates.  For the
Yamaichi Securities failure, all the main banks except Sumitomo Bank and Sanwa Bank
are again significant at a five percent level, although those two just miss entering at a ten
percent confidence level.  This result is significant because it suggests that the structural
breaks identified by the F-test results reflect changes in the sensitivity of the firms to
returns on their main banks, rather than, for example, only reflecting changes in the
firms’ market betas.
8
For all of the main banks studied, the sign of the main bank coefficients are
negative and significant prior to the break date for all historical break dates.  However,
the coefficient estimates after the break date vary slightly across the main bank portfolios.
Four of the main bank portfolios, Tokai, IBJ, Daiwa, and Fuji are positive and significant
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after the break, while three of the main banks, Sumitomo, Sanwa and Dai-ichi Kangyo,
are usually insignificant.
9
Note that the main bank portfolios that fail to show a significant positive
dependence on the returns of their main banks are the strongest banks in the sample
financially.
10  As we discussed above, one would expect the sensitivity of firms to their
main banks to be greatest when their main banks are in a weak financial condition.  When
banks are weak financially, a given change in bank equity values should have a greater
impact on bank lending practices.  This notion is confirmed by the result that the main
bank coefficients for all of the weaker main banks in the sample enter positively and
significantly after the structural break.
3.3 Unknown Break Dates
While the historical break dates posited above are all plausible, the fact that it is
impossible to prefer one over the other implies that the break date must be treated as
unknown.  Moreover, the dates chosen are subject to “pre-testing” bias, because it is
impossible to select break dates without prior information about the underlying data.
Andrews (1993) has developed a method to deal with this problem by explicitly adjusting
the confidence interval estimates of the F-tests for structural breaks for the manner in
which the break date is chosen.
To choose the break date, we first identify a subgroup of admissible dates.
Andrews (1993) demonstrates that restricting the search to a sub-sample of the data is
required, as allowing every date to be a potential break date would preclude convergence
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in the estimation process.  We choose the two-and-one-half year time-period that contains
all three of the historical events entertained in the previous section.  We define the set of
potential break dates as all dates between July 3, 1995 and December 30, 1997.  Since the
window incorporates most of the major events in Japanese financial markets over the
course of the sample, it appears likely that any breaks in the data would occur within this
period.  This period represents approximately one-fourth of the time series in the sample.
As Andrews demonstrates, increasing the size of this window would reduce the power of
our test.
We then break the sample in two for every potential break date within the
window.  We estimate equation (1) for each sample and run a standard Chow test using
the F-statistic generated by comparing the results of the two sub-samples with those of
the unbroken sample in section 3.1.  Standard errors are then obtained from Andrews
(1993).  This methodology gives us an F-statistic for the possibility of a structural break
for each portfolio of main banks for each potential break date that has been adjusted for
pre-testing bias.
The F-statistics for each of the main bank portfolios are plotted for each potential
break date in Figure 1, with the date with highest F-statistic value indicated.  The striking
feature of our results is that each of the portfolios suggests a similar period for the
structural break, near the end of 1997.  Four of the seven time series, Tokai, IBJ, Sanwa,
and Dai-ichi Kangyo, peak in December of 1997, while the other three time series peak
earlier.  Fuji peaks in September of 1997, while Daiwa and Sumitomo peak in October
and November of that year respectively.
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The identification of this period as the timing of a structural break in the main
bank relationship is consistent with the notion that the main bank relationship would be
more important during turbulent financial episodes.  Japan experienced a rash of
significant failures in its financial sector during this period, beginning with that of Kyoto
Kyoei bank in October.  Problems escalated in November, with the first city bank failure,
that of Hokkaido Takushoku, and the failure of two large Japanese securities companies,
Sanyo and Yamaichi Securities.
11  Peek and Rosengren (1998) also identify November of
1997 as the month in which positive spreads emerged on interbank loan rates for
Japanese banks, the so-called “Japan Premium.”
The results for the main bank portfolios using this “maximum F-value” method
are shown in Table 4.  The results are quite similar to those using posited historical break
dates above.  All of the coefficient values prior to the break dates are negative and
significant at a five percent confidence level.  Subsequent to the break date, all main bank
portfolios except Sumitomo and Sanwa enter positive and significant at the five-percent
confidence level.  All of the measured differences between the estimated main bank
coefficients with the exception of Sumitomo Bank are also positive and significant at a
five percent confidence level.  Again, Sumitomo and Sanwa are the strongest banks in
our sample and the results for those main banks would be expected to be weakest.
4. Robustness tests
4.1 Instrumental variables estimation 
Because a firm’s main bank is likely to be exposed to its client firms, both as a
lender and as an equity holder, there is a possibility of simultaneity bias in the estimation
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of equation (1).  To accommodate this possibility, we evaluate the robustness of our
above results to instrumental variables estimation, using the returns on the other main
banks in our portfolio as the instruments.  In each case all of the other six main banks are
used as instruments for the main bank series being studied.  The intuition behind this
specification is that main bank returns will be dependent on the returns of other banks
because of news relevant to Japanese banks.  As these other banks are not, by definition,
as exposed to the main bank’s client firms as their main bank, their returns are valid as
instruments.
The results for instrumental variables estimation using the maximum F-value
method for timing the structural break date are shown in Table 5.
12  It can be seen that the
results are quite similar to those obtained using ordinary least squares estimation.  As
before, we find evidence of a structural break in the sensitivity of portfolio equity values
for all of the main bank portfolios at a five percent confidence level.  In addition, we find
that the coefficient on main bank equity after the structural break is significantly higher
than that before the structural break for all main banks in the sample.  We also find that
all main bank coefficients prior to the structural break are negative and significant at a
five percent confidence level.
We now find that the dependence of the Dai-ichi Kangyo portfolio on its main
bank’s returns is insignificant after the break, in addition to the Sanwa Bank and
Sumitomo Bank portfolio results we found above. The remaining majority of main banks
are positive and significant as before.  However, Dai-Ichi Kangyo is the next strongest
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bank financially after Sanwa and Sumitomo, so the qualitative results concerning bank
financial strength are quite similar to those found using ordinary least squares estimates.
The most striking distinction is that the instrumental variable results are not as
uniform in their timing of the structural break.  While three of the main bank portfolios
find the structural break in the fourth quarter of 1997 in accordance with the ordinary
least squares results, the results for the other main bank portfolios time the structural
break as occurring in the beginning of 1997, or some time in 1996.  These results shed
doubt on the uniformity in the timing of the structural break suggested by the ordinary
least squares estimates.  However, it should be remembered that the differences in the
sub-samples identified by these different break dates are not that large relative to the ten-
year estimation period.
4.2 Inclusion of a banking index
It is possible that the estimated sensitivity of the firms to their main bank returns
may simply reflect sensitivity to news about Japan’s banking system, rather than news
specific to its main bank.  Individual bank returns are likely to reflect the fortunes of the
banking industry as a whole.  As a result, finding a positive dependence of firm portfolio
returns on the returns of their main bank may simply imply dependence on the banking
industry, rather than a renewed dependence on their main bank.  To test for this
possibility, we examine the robustness of our results concerning the main bank
coefficient to the inclusion of an index of bank industry returns using both ordinary least
squares and instrumental variables estimation methods.19
The results with the banking index included are shown in Table 6.  Structural
break dates were identified using the maximum F-value technique, and standard errors
are adjusted according to the Andrews (1993) method.
13  It can be seen that the bank
index coefficient is uniformly negative and statistically significant prior to the structural
break, but varies widely across main bank portfolios after the structural break.
As before, almost all of the main bank portfolios show evidence of a structural
break at statistically significant levels.  The lone exception here is Daiwa Bank, which
fails to pass the F-test for a structural break using ordinary least squares estimation, but
does pass at a 5 percent confidence level using the instrumental variables technique.
The majority of the main bank portfolios studied again show a statistically
significant increase in the main bank coefficient regardless of the estimation method
used.  These include Tokai, IBJ, Daiwa, and Fuji.  However, the Sumitomo and Sanwa
Bank portfolios actually change sign and show a statistically significant decrease in their
main bank coefficient after the structural break, again regardless of the estimation method
used.  The estimated change in the main bank coefficient of the Dai-ichi Kangyo
portfolio is positive, but insignficant.
Again, the three banks which fail to show a statistically significant increase in the
bank index coefficient are the three strongest main banks in the sample, Sumitomo,
Sanwa, and Dai-ichi Kangyo.
14  Moreover, the four strongest banks, including the three
above and IBJ, all fail to show a positive and statistically significant main bank
coefficient after the structural break, while the coefficient estimates for the three weaker
banks in the sample, Tokai, Daiwa and Fuji are positive and statistically significant.  This
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relative weakness in the performance of the stronger main bank portfolios mirrors the
relative weakness in the strongest banks in the base regression above.  As before, the
stronger banks in the sample would be expected to display weaker results because their
lending behavior would be expected to be less sensitive to shocks to their equity values.
It is also interesting to compare the relative size of the main bank coefficients to
those on the bank index returns.
15  Because bank index returns also change over the
structural breaks, we compare pre and post break main bank coefficients with pre and
post-break bank index betas.
These results are also shown in Table 6.  Prior to the estimated structural break
dates, we find that main bank sensitivity exceeds sensitivity to the bank index returns for
all main bank portfolios in the sample under ordinary least squares, although differences
are insignificant under instrumental variables estimation for Tokai, Daiwa, and Sumitomo
Bank.  Subsequent to the structural breaks, we again find disparities that reflect bank
financial strength.  Main bank sensitivity is significantly less than bank index sensitivity
for the two strongest main bank portfolios, Sumitomo and Sanwa Bank, while the other
banks in the sample tend to display greater sensitivity to their main banks, although not
always at statistically significant levels.
5. Conclusion
This paper provides evidence that Japanese entities are still sensitive to their main
banks during episodes of financial turbulence.  While the entity portfolios failed to
demonstrate sensitivity to the returns of their main banks when coefficients were
                                                                                                                                                
14 IBJ actually has the same rating as Dai-ichi Kangyo, but a lower rating than Sumitomo or Sanwa.
15 Since the bank index retruns are also expressed in percentages, there are no unit issues here.21
constrained to remain constant over the entire sample, allowing for a structural break
reveals that these portfolios were sensitive to returns of their main banks during the
turbulent late 1990s.  These results were particularly robust for the weaker banks in our
sample, but all banks in the sample demonstrated evidence of a structural break over the
sample period.
In addition, the estimated timing of the structural break in the main bank
relationship using the maximum F-statistic method under ordinary least squares was quite
uniform across the seven main banks studied.  Using the maximum F-statistic method and
ordinary least squares estimation, all of the seven main banks identified the fourth quarter
of 1997 as the period containing the structural break. This was a very turbulent period for
the Japanese banking system, with the first failure of a Japanese city bank, Hokkaido
Takushoku, as well as the failure of Sanyo and Yamaichi Securities.  The estimated
timing of the structural break was less uniform when using instrumental variables, but the
qualitative differences between the two sample periods remained relatively robust.
These results suggest that the problems associated with the information advantage
enjoyed by an entity’s main bank are most likely to arise in environments in which
liquidity is poor.  Moreover, they suggest that the main bank system of finance still
pursued in Japan may provide an additional argument for a “credit channel” in business
cycles.
There were a number of banks whose increase in main bank sensitivity was not
found to be robust to the inclusion of an index for the banking industry as a whole.
However, robustness was systematically related to main bank financial strength.  In
particular, the two strongest main banks in the sample, Sumitomo and Sanwa, actually22
demonstrated a statistically significant decrease in main bank sensitivity after the
estimated structural break.
While the decrease in the value of the main bank coefficient for the two strongest
banks was surprising, the fact that robustness paralleled bank weakness was not.  Our
hypothesis maintained that firms would be sensitive to the returns of their main banks
during turbulent financial episodes because adverse news for their main bank could have
bad implications for that bank’s lending capacity.  This would be less of a concern for the
strongest banks in the system, as they should be better able to weather adverse news
without marked reductions in lending activity.23
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Average % Average % Average










Tokai Bank Baa1 5 4.880 4.800 4.520
IBJ A3 7 4.700 4.729 4.829
Daiwa Bank Baa3 7 4.986 4.933 4.833
Sumitomo A2 12 4.567 4.642 4.508
Sanwa A1 15 4.633 4.600 4.657
Dai-ichi Kangyo A3 20 4.675 4.650 4.528
Fuji Bank Baa1 16 4.800 4.600 4.506
1 Credit ratings based on Moody’s for long-term deposits in 1998. Number of entities
refers to number of entities in sample which list bank as their main bank. Equity exposure





Mainbank Ci r,t Rm,t Rmb,t Obs R
2
Tokai -0.00007 0.00009 1.0594** -0.0241** 2741 0.5163
(0.0003) (0.00009) (0.0239) (0.0121)
IBJ -0.0005  0.0002** 1.2997** -0.0488** 2741 0.6396
(0.00030) (0.00008) (0.0249) (0.0120)
Daiwa 0.0001 -0.00001 1.0473** 0.0151** 2741 0.6019
(0.0003) (0.00007) (0.0189) (0.0078)
Sumitomo -0.0002 0.00006  1.0147** -0.0450** 2741 0.7149
(0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0164) (0.0086)
Sanwa -0.0002 0.0001 1.1334** -0.0341** 2741 0.6504
(0.0002) (0.00007) (0.0208) (0.0106)
Dai-ichi Kangyo -0.00004 0.00006 1.1331** -0.0361** 2741 0.7930
(0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0148) (0.0072)
Fuji -0.0001 0.00008 1.0444** -0.0061 2741 0.7180
(0.0002) (0.00005) (0.0172) (0.0079)
1 Estimated by ordinary least squares. ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.
* indicates significance at a 10% confidence level.27
Table 3
               Estimation Results:
Historical Break Dates
1
Failure Event Tokai IBJ Daiwa Sumitomo Sanwa Dai-ichi Fuji
Cosmo Credit
(7/31/95)
            β mb -0.085**  -0.115**   -0.042**  -0.082**   -0.064**  -0.083**  -0.077**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009) (0.011)
            β ’mb   0.088**  0.051**   0.050**  -0.014  0.007   0.019  0.065**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.011) (0.017) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013)
       β ’mb - β mb 0.173** 0.166** 0.092** 0.068** 0.071** 0.102** 0.142**
(0.028) (0.028) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025) (0.016) (0.017)
F-Value  11.569**  14.013**  8.264**  12.3**  3.117**  14.739** 20.75**
II. Hanwa Bank
(11/21/96)
          β mb   -0.079**  -0.111**  -0.036**  -0.077** -0.068**  -0.079**   -0.078**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.009) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
          β ’mb  0.12**  0.051*  0.052**  -0.021   0.012  0.022  0.067**
(0.034) (0.031) (0.014) (0.023) (0.028) (0.017) (0.015)
      β ’mb - β mb 0.199** 0.162** 0.088** 0.056** 0.08** 0.101** 0.145**
(0.036) (0.033) (0.018) (0.024) (0.030) (0.019) (0.019)
F-Value  13.799**  17.176**  8.741**  15.578**  7.463**  16.651**  22.247**
1 Estimated by ordinary least squares. Break dates treated as known. β mb represents
estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while β ’mb represents
coefficient subsequent to structural break.  F-value represents results of structural break
Chow test.  ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at
a 10% confidence level.28
Table 3
                  Estimation Results:
Historical Break Dates
1




           β mb  -0.070**  -0.102**  -0.027**  -0.066**   -0.057**  -0.073**  -0.064**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
           β ’mb  0.183**  0.101**  0.067** -0.012 0.006 0.060**   0.091**
(0.048) (0.044) (0.018) (0.035) (0.044) (0.024) (0.021)
      β ’mb - β mb 0.253** 0.203** 0.094** 0.054 0.063 0.133** 0.155**
(0.049) (0.046) (0.021) (0.036) (0.045) (0.025) (0.023)
F-Value  16.029**  22.569**  10.14**  18.112**  8.677**  20.995**  23.060**
1 Estimated by ordinary least squares. Break dates treated as known. B2 represents
estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while B
'
2 represents
coefficient subsequent to structural break.  F-value represents results of structural break
Chow test.  ** indicates significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at
a 10% confidence level.29
Table 4
Estimation Results:




Dates ββββ mb ββββ ’mb ββββ ’mb - ββββ mb F-Value
Tokai  12/24/97  -0.071**   0.224** 0.296**  20.739**
(0.012) (0.048) (0.049)
IBJ 12/05/97 -0.104**  0.117** 0.221** 24.837**
(0.0121) (0.045) (0.047)
Daiwa 10/13/97  -0.038**  0.067** 0.106**  12.211*
(0.010) (0.017) (0.020)
Sumitomo  11/21/97   -0.066**  -0.016 0.050  19.796**
(0.010) (0.034) (0.035)
Sanwa  12/17/97 -0.064**  0.035 0.099**  11.677*
(0.011) (0.045) (0.046)
Dai-ichi Kangyo 12/17/97 -0.075**  0.070** 0.145** 23.414**
(0.008) (0.025) (0.026)
Fuji  9/25/97  -0.071**  0.081** 0.152**  24.377**
(0.009) (0.020) (0.022)
1 Estimated by ordinary least squares. Break dates chosen by maximum F-value method.
B2 represents estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while
B
'
2 represents coefficient subsequent to structural break.  Standard errors adjusted for pre-
testing bias.  F-value represents results of structural break Chow test.  ** indicates
significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level.30
Table 5
Instrumental Variables




Dates ββββ mb ββββ ’mb ββββ ’mb - ββββ mb F-Value
Tokai 11/17/97 -0.281** 0.196** 0.477** 21.911**
(0.026) (0.080) (0.084)
IBJ 12/08/97 -0.200** 0.180** 0.379** 30.457**
(0.020) (0.067) (0.070)
Daiwa 9/25/96 -0.290** 0.120** 0.411** 22.380**
(0.035) (0.029) (0.045)
Sumitomo 1/10/97 -0.187** 0.036 0.2230** 39.271**
(0.014) (0.033) (0.0358)
Sanwa 4/12/96 -0.247** 0.054 0.301** 24.948**
(0.020) (0.034) (0.040)
Dai-ichi Kangyo 7/15/96 -0.197** -0.019 0.177** 29.226**
(0.013) (0.024) (0.027)
Fuji 12/16/97 -0.142** 0.126** 0.268** 28.738**
(0.014) (0.033) (0.036)
1 See text for list of instruments.  Break dates chosen by maximum F-value method. B2
represents estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while B
'
2
represents coefficient subsequent to structural break.  Standard errors adjusted for pre-
testing bias.  F-value represents results of structural break Chow test.  ** indicates
significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level.31
Table 6
Estimation Results with Bank Index Added
Break Dates Chosen from Maximum F-Values
1





12/24/97 12/5/97 10/14/97 11/21/97 10/28/97 7/15/96 9/13/96
   ββββ mb -0.021 -0.038** -0.019* -0.003 0.019 0.015 0.007
(0.013) (0.015) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.010) (0.013)
   ββββ ’mb 0.229** 0.080 0.064** -0.152** -0.138** 0.049** 0.072**
(0.059) (0.056) (0.018) (0.042) (0.047) (0.020) (0.019)
ββββ ’mb - ββββ mb 0.250** 0.117** 0.083** -0.150** -0.155** 0.035 0.065**
(0.060) (0.058) (0.021) (0.044) (0.049) (0.023) (0.024)
ββββ mb - ββββ bi 0.259** 0.224** 0.180** 0.208** 0.319** 0.367** 0.307**
(0.037) (0.038) (0.031) (0.026) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034)
ββββ ’mb - ββββ ’bi 0.248* -0.066 0.015 -0.606** -0.640** 0.159** 0.091
(0.149) (0.145) (0.091) (0.099) (0.119) (0.050) (0.057)
F-Value 21.032** 26.947** 12.950 44.422** 32.663** 28.313** 22.6174**
1 Estimated by ordinary least squares. Break dates chosen by maximum F-value method.
β mb represents estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while
β ’mb represents coefficient subsequent to structural break. β bi represents estimated
coefficient on bank index returns prior to structural break, while β ’bi represents the bank
index coefficient estimate subsequent to structural break. Standard errors adjusted for
pre-testing bias.  F-value represents results of structural break Chow test.  ** indicates
significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at a 10% confidence level.32
Table 6
Estimation Results with Bank Index Added







11/17/97 5/14/96 9/25/96 11/21/97 10/28/97 7/15/96 12/16/97
   ββββ mb -0.145** -0.046 -0.169** -0.064** -0.041 -0.023 -0.044
(0.057) (0.045) (0.075) (0.028) (0.039) (0.026) (0.030)
   ββββ ’mb 0.278* 0.201** 0.164** -0.234** -0.320** 0.018 0.097
(0.168) (0.093) (0.041) (0.075) (0.077) (0.053) (0.064)
ββββ ’mb - ββββ mb 0.423** 0.247** 0.334** -0.170** -0.279** 0.041 0.147**
(0.177) (0.103) (0.085) (0.080) (0.086) (0.059) (0.071)
ββββ mb - ββββ bi 0.033 0.306** -0.045 0.070 0.185** 0.277** 0.120**
(0.087) (0.080) (0.101) (0.050) (0.065) (0.047) (0.053)
ββββ ’mb - ββββ ’bi 0.407 0.362** 0.288** -0.767** -1.066** 0.080 0.026
(0.289) (0.164) (0.090) (0.137) (0.155) (0.096) (0.148)
F-Value 16.790** 25.141** 15.598** 45.025** 37.120** 27.314** 23.443**
1Estimated by instrumental variables. Break dates chosen by maximum F-value method.
β mb represents estimated coefficient on main bank returns prior to structural break, while
β ’mb represents coefficient subsequent to structural break. β bi represents estimated
coefficient on bank index returns prior to structural break, while β ’bi represents the bank
index coefficient estimate subsequent to structural break. Standard errors adjusted for
pre-testing bias.  F-value represents results of structural break Chow test.  ** indicates
significance at a 5% confidence level.  * indicates significance at a10% confidence level.33
Figure 1
F-values over event window
1
1
 Estimated by ordinary least squares. Sample window from 7/3/95 through 12/30/97.
Graphs plot F-values obtained given sample separated at date t.  Date shown corresponds
to maximum F-value for sample.
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